

# **Rack Disaggregation Using PCIe Networking**


**Cloud Computing Research Center for  
Mobile Applications (CCMA)  
Industrial Technology Research Institute  
雲端運算行動應用研究中心**

# Rack Disaggregation

- Rack as the basic building block for cloud-scale data centers
- Rack disaggregation: pooling of HW resources for **global allocation** and **independent upgrade cycle for each resource type**
- CPU/memory/NICs/Disks embedded in individual hosts
  - Disk pooling in a rack
  - NIC/Disk pooling in a rack
  - Memory/NIC/Disk pooling in a rack
- Enabling technology: High-speed rack-area networking that allows direct memory access
  - PCI Express is a promising candidate ( $\text{Gen3} \times 8 = 64\text{Gbps}$ )
  - New top-of-rack (TOR) switch consists of PCIe ports and Ethernet ports


# I/O Device Disaggregation

- **Reduce cost:** One I/O device per rack rather than one per host
- **Maximize Utilization:** Statistical multiplexing benefit
- **Power efficient:** intra-rack networking and device count
- **Reliability:** Pool of devices available for backup




# ITRI Software-based MR-SRIOV

- **Standard PCIe switches and device:**
  - No MR-IOV capability
  - Native driver
  - Zero data copying
- **Native Performance:**
  - Control path goes to a central authority
  - Direct data path to and from devices
- **Secure Sharing:**
  - Access control using existing technologies




# I/O Virtualization

- **Direct communication:**
  - Device directly assigned to VMs
  - Bypass the hypervisor
- **Physical Function:**
  - configure and manage the SR-IOV functionality
- **Virtual Function:**
  - lightweight PCIe function with resources necessary for data movement
- **VT-x and VT-d**
  - CPU/Chipset support for VMs and devices




However, works only in a single host (hence Single Root)

# Single Root (SR) Architecture





# Multi Root (MR) Architecture




# Non-Transparent Bridge (NTB)

## • PCI Enumeration

- Host1's enumeration finds X and NTB-D
- Host 2's enumeration finds Y and NTB-E

## • Translations between domains


- NTB-D exposes a portion of physical memory address range of Host2's domain
- Memory address:
  - From primary side and secondary side
- PCI device ID:
  - Querying the ID lookup table (LUT)





# NTB Address Mapping

- NTB maps from:
  - <the **primary** side to the **secondary** side>
- Mapping from **addrA** at primary side to **addrB** at the secondary side
- Example:
  - AddrA = 0x8000 at BAR4 from **Host1**
  - AddrB = 0x10000 at **Host2's** DRAM
- One-way Translation:
  - Read/write at addrA in Host 1 == read/write addrB in Host 2
  - Read/write at addrB in Host 2 **has nothing to do** with addrA in Host 1






Ladon: a hundred-heads dragon  
who guards the Garden of Hesperides

**Ladon:** A software-defined  
PCIe network architecture  
that supports secure MR-IOV  
using SR-IOV devices


# System Components

- Management Host (MH)
  - Manage the shared I/O devices
- Compute Host (CH)
  - Non-virtualized host OS can directly access VF
  - Virtualized host with VMs can directly access VF
- Non-Transparent Bridge (NTB)
  - Each CH connects to the fabric via an NTB
- PCIe Switch & SR-IOV device
  - PF and multiple VFs




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
However, applicable in a single host (SR -> Single Root)

# Global Physical Address Space




# Virtual NIC Configuration

- Each virtual NIC in a CH is backed by a VF of an SRIOV NIC
- Identify the virtual NIC's CSR, MMIO, MSI-X and DMA payload area
- Install mappings in the BARs of the associated NTB port



# Secure Threats: 4 Cases

## Malicious VM, CH and MH



VF1 is assigned to VM1 in CH1, but it can screw multiple memory areas.

# Security Guarantees: Summary

- Intra-host
  - A VF assigned to a VM can only access to the physical memory of its associated VM
  - Protected by CH's IOMMU
- Inter-host
  - A VF can only access the physical memory of its associated CH
  - A host cannot touch other CHs' or MH's memory
  - Protected by CHs' LUT & IOMMU
- Inter-VF / inter-device
  - A VF can not write to other VFs' registers
  - Protected by MH's IOMMU
- Even a compromised MH cannot touch other CHs' memory




# Optimizations

- Zero driver modification

- DMA operands' addresses are in MH's address space rather than in CH's or VM's physical address space
- Solution: transparent trapping of DMA access API calls


- Zero-copy

- BAR window size is limited by BIOS (between 3G-4G)
- Solution: Mapping the entire CH's physical memory space to avoid copying.



# Inter-Host Communications

- RDMA: Remote DMA from one host's memory to another host's memory
- Cross-Machine Memory Copying (CMMC): from the address space of one process on one host to the address space of another process on another host
- Ethernet over PCIe (EOP):
  - Destination node is inside the rack: sent out via PCIe
  - Destination node is outside the rack: sent out via shared Ethernet NIC




Let's see some performance numbers!

# TESTBED EVALUATION


Video Available: [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B\\_-GesOjkG0](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B_-GesOjkG0)




# Prototype Implementation



# Latency



# TCP RX/TX Throughput





# Scalability / Compatibility

- How many CHs/VMs can Ladon support?
  - Each CH: 2 BARs for CSR and MMIO, 2 BARs for DMA and MSI-X
  - As many VMs as a CH could run
  - As many CHs as are allowed by the PCIe switch
- How many SRIOV devices can Ladon shares?
  - As many as are allowed by the PCIe switch
- Vendor-neutrality
  - Ladon only uses the basic features of NTB: address translation, device ID translation and DMA
  - Intel's on-board NTB and DMA support: Xeon C5500/C3500
  - PCIe device: **physical** device driver needs modification but **SRIOV** driver does not

# Summary

- A software-defined PCIe-based rack-area network architecture
  - Allows multiple servers to share and directly access SRIOV PCIe devices
- A secure I/O device sharing scheme
  - Prevents unauthorized accesses to shared I/O devices by leveraging EPT, IOMMU, BAR translation tables, and LUT
- A fully operational Ladon prototype
  - Successfully demonstrates the feasibility and efficiency of the software-based MRIOV
  - **Zero** throughput/latency penalty when compared with SRIOV
  - **Full HA** support for MH
- Integration of PCIe with Intel's silicon photonics technology?



# Strawman Proposal for Disaggregated I/O

- Every host comes with an NTB, a DMA engine and a PCIe expansion adapter
- A transparent PCIe switch
- A set of SRIOV PCIe devices
- An MH or controller that
  - Enumerates the available SRIOV devices
  - Allocates and reclaims the virtual functions on SRIOV devices
  - Includes HA support
- On each CH
  - An original SRIOV device driver for each SRIOV device
  - A specially-built PCIe driver that communicates with MH



# Thank You!

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